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          This paper examines how inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) have influenced
the restructuring of the Japanese economy and can be expected to continue to do so in the future. We
find that outward investment has helped Japanese firms to sustain foreign market shares and
contributed to the restructuring of the Japanese economy away from older industries. By shifting
from exporting to affiliate production, there has been a geographical reallocation of the activities of
Japanese firms, particularly those of multinational manufacturing firms. However, Japanese outward
FDI is still not very large relative to the Japanese economy, despite the rapid growth since the mid-
1980s, and there is still scope for significant increase when compared with the levels of most other
OECD countries. Inward FDI will presumably have an even stronger impact on the restructuring of
the Japanese economy. Although the stock of inward foreign direct investment is still very small,
there are important changes under way. Deregulation has opened up much of the industrial and
service sectors to foreign multinationals. 
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Both outward and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) play an important role in restructuring
economies. Outward investment is a way of maximizing the rents on the accumulated knowledge
and skill of a country’s firms, or preserving them as long as possible when the country itself has
lost its comparative advantage in their industries, and the industries, or parts of them must
relocate. Inward investment may bring new firm specific skills and new industries to countries
that lack them or preserve the rents on workers’ skills in sectors where domestic firms have lost
their firm specific advantages. In this paper we will analyze the role outward and inward FDI can
play in the coming restructuring of the Japanese economy.
The paper begins with a brief description of the major changes in the economic structure
of Japan in the last 20 years and discusses some important factors that may influence the future
development of the Japanese economy. Among the factors included here are the implications of
institutional changes, such as the continuing deregulation of the Japanese economy and
economic changes, such as the aging of the population, the rise in per capita income, and the
increasing education and labor force participation of  women. With this as a background, we
examine what role outward and inward FDI can play in this restructuring process.
With respect to outward FDI, we will ask what types of production (e.g. labor intensive,
skill intensive etc.) and activities Japanese firms have moved abroad in the past and what type
they are likely to move in the future. And what are the motivations for these re-locations?  How
are they related to, for instance, changes in relative production costs in Japan vis-á-vis foreign
countries or in the availability of skills?
                                                
1 The research reported here is part of the NBER program in International Studies.  Blomström’s work on the study
was supported by HSFR.3
A different role is envisioned for inward investment. So far, we have seen relatively little
activity by foreign multinationals in Japan, but because of gradual deregulation we expect that to
change in the future. Inward FDI will bring foreign firms’ skills and technologies to Japan in
areas where Japanese firms, partly because of the protected environment in which they have
developed, are relatively uncompetitive. These Japanese firms may be forced by the intensified
competition to shrink or disappear.
2. The Japanese Economy: Recent Changes and Future Developments
Every fast growing economy has to go through significant structural transformations, shifting
production and employment from low to high productivity activities. The remarkable economic
performance during the 20
th century, particularly between 1950 and 1990, is a testimony of
Japan’s ability to adapt and restructure. Japan grew rapidly after World War II, with an average
annual growth rate of eight per cent from 1953 to 1973 and over 10 per cent in the 1960s. As
Wolff (2000b) documents, Japan was able to transform from a mid-tech based economy in 1970
to a high-tech region by the mid-1990s. Japan’s rate of transformation was much more rapid than
that of its primary competitors, the United States and Germany.
Production shifted from an agricultural and light manufacturing base before WWII to
heavy industry and, increasingly, to services. Employment trends reflect these shifts in Japan’s
economy. In 1954, primary sectors (agriculture and mining) accounted for 38 per cent of
employment, while manufacturing comprised only 17.8 per cent. By 1970, primary production
had fallen in relative terms to 17.8 per cent of the labor force and manufacturing had risen to 27
per cent of employment. As in other developed countries, the workforce has continued to move
sharply out of agricultural production and toward services (see Table 1). Manufacturing’s share4
of overall employment has actually fallen since 1977, in spite of Japan’s enormous success as an
exporter of manufactured goods.
Within the manufacturing sector there were also major changes in structure. In the 1950s,
manufacturing was dominated by textile and other light industry. Iron and steel production and
the shipbuilding industry rose to prominence in the 1960s, followed by the chemical sector. By
the 1970s, electronics and automobile production dominated manufacturing activities. Since the
1970s, electrical machinery and chemicals, particularly the former, continued to grow much
faster than manufacturing production in general (see Table 2). Transport equipment did not even
quite keep up with the average in manufacturing. Food and tobacco and iron and steel declined in
importance relative to other manufacturing industries, and textiles shrank in absolute size.
Although these are very broad groupings, it is tempting to see in these changes a shift to more
technology-intensive sectors.
Another mirror that reflects changes in the Japanese and world economies is the
composition of trade. An advantage of trade data is that they are available in more detail than
production or employment, especially for the world as a whole or for other individual countries
with which we might wish to compare Japan.
For world trade as a whole, the major changes between 1977 and 1995, as shown in Table
3, were a large growth in the share of Electrical machinery and large declines in Foods and
Metals, both relatively declining industries within Japanese manufacturing production as well.
World trade as a whole has been moving to computers and electrical and electronic equipment
and away from primary production and from capital goods used in primary production.
The path of development of the composition of Japanese exports has been similar in
many ways, but often steeper (see Table 4). The two predominantly primary industry groups,5
Foods and Metals, declined faster as parts of Japanese exports than as part of world exports.
Japan already showed a revealed comparative disadvantage in exports of Foods in 1977. The
relative descent of Metals in 1995 is particularly striking, as Japan had been a relatively strong
exporter of metals, particularly steel, in 1977. It would not be surprising if the decline of Metals
continued in the future.
The individual industries for which the share of Japanese exports grew the most were all
industries for which shares in world exports grew, but Japan seemed to be leading the way in this
shift. Among the most rapidly declining industries in Japanese exports, three of the four were
also declining in world exports, but not as quickly as in Japan. Thus, we can summarize the
trends in trade by saying that as the world was shifting out of primary production and trade and
into more technologically advanced products, Japan was doing the same, but more sharply,
leading the way.
Another way to describe the shifts in Japanese trade structure is to compare them with the
trade structure, and changes in it, for the United States, the highest country in per capita income
and presumably the world's technological leader (again Table 4). The shares of the seven major
industry groups in Japanese exports in 1995 were closer to those in US exports than they were in
1977 in five cases and further away in only two. The sum of the absolute differences in shares
between Japan and the US in the seven industry groups was 57.5 percentage points in 1977, but
by 1995, the Japanese export shares had moved much closer to the US shares of 1977, the sum of
the differences being reduced to 41.0. Thus, the distribution of exports by the US appears to
serve as a leading indicator of the future changes in the structure of Japanese exports. By 1995,
the total of the percentage differences was down to 33.3. Thus, the Japanese export pattern was6
not only catching up to the earlier US pattern, but was following some of the changes that were
taking place in the US distribution.
2.1 The Future
Turning to the changes that we expect in the underlying characteristics of Japan’s economy in
the next few decades, a closer look at demographic trends is crucial. Japanese demographics and
family practices are interacting in a dramatic manner. Japan has recently achieved the longest life
expectancy of all countries. Fully one-third of the Japanese are expected to be over sixty-five
years of age in 2040, double the level of 1995. The size of the total population is expected to
peak around 2010. Simultaneously, rates of fertility have dropped to 1.4 per woman, in part due
to a delay in womens’ decisions to marry. These demographic influences will presumably result
in a severe labor shortage early in the twenty-first century at a time when the aging population
will place severe pressure on health and welfare facilities. As Mason and Ogawa (2000b) point
out, Japan will likely experience a slowing in the traditionally high savings rate as the population
continues to age. This, in turn, implies a dramatic slowdown in investment and long-term growth
rates unless offsetting increases in productivity emerge.
Yet, throughout history Japan has risen to challenges by restructuring its culture and
economy. As we discuss above, Japan has rapidly adjusted its industrial activities during this
century to move from agriculture and low-tech manufacturing to high tech industries.
Blomström, et al. (2000b) provide details on numerous adjustments that will likely be
forthcoming in the twenty-first century, many of which will have implications for inward and
outward FDI. Likewise, FDI will act as an additional catalyst for adjustment to the new demands
of the global information age. In this section, we highlight three of the main structural
adjustments that are underway in the Japanese economy.7
A major structural change is the liberalization of the labor market and the greater
inclusion of women in the labor force. The conventional wisdom is that low unemployment rates
and job turnover rates, attributable to a system of ‘life-time employment’ and worker devotion to
the firm, contributed to Japan’s rapid growth. Firms invested heavily in costly worker education
that focused on providing broad exposure to manufacturing activities, increasing productivity
and firm-specific innovations. The system also acted as a type of private pension plan that
essentially underpaid young workers with the promise of job security and a generous senior
employee package. Ito (1996) asserts that the lifetime employment system is facing problems
similar to pay-as-you-go retirement systems in other countries as the population rapidly ages.
Also changing, according to Ito, is the need for very narrowly and highly specialized workers in
high technology and service sectors, such as telecommunications, computer information and
software, and finance. In response, the broad-based, firm-specific worker training in
manufacturing will shrink. As the labor force within high-growth,  high-technology sectors
expands, the demand for specialized education and the job turnover rate will rise. Within the
twenty-first century, labor markets will become increasingly flexible. Unemployment rates will
be closer to US levels, reflecting a more competitive business environment. Labor practices will
also undergo fundamental changes with performance and merit increasingly determining
advancement.
In response to an increasing labor shortage, we anticipate that the twenty-first century
will also bring a new role for Japanese women. Women have traditionally been underutilized
given their level of education. While the increase in women’s engagement in the labor force has
been quite rapid, Mason and Ogawa (2000b) report a 1997 female participation rate of only 50
per cent (relative to 77.7 per cent amongst males). Women, especially if married, currently tend8
to work part-time. Yet, gender discrimination in the labor market seems to be easing in response
to market conditions. Thus, a conceivable scenario would be for Japanese female participation
rates to increase in response to labor shortages and more closely resemble patterns in other
OECD countries.
The increasing role for women in the labor market will tend to make child-rearing even
more challenging. Thus, we foresee a persistent pressure on the Japanese labor force to be highly
productive and competitive in order to maintain a high living standard. Japan may seek to ease
its highly restrictive immigration policies to expand the workforce. More likely in our view, as
we discuss in the next section of this paper, Japanese firms will increasingly relocate their less
skilled labor activities overseas.
A second structural adjustment in the Japanese economy is that of regulatory reform.
Twentieth-century Japan has been characterized by a high level of governmental involvement
and regulation in most industries (see Carlile and Tilton, 1998). Japan’s post-war development
strategy relied on a public-private partnership. The government sought to modernize the
economic base by selecting promising industries and actively nurturing capacity by limiting
competition, supporting research, development, and technology transfers, and encouraging the
extension of credit. Industries with a potential to achieve economies of scale and scope were
particularly favored and permitted to form horizontal and vertical cartels that cooperated on
pricing, R&D, production, etc. The government also aimed to protect special interests, such as
rice farmers and small retail shops, against competition through a complex system of licensing,
regulation, and quality control standards.
This close partnership between business interests and the Japanese government is in
direct contrast to the Western, and particularly the American model, which is grounded in a9
tradition of strong antitrust policy, market competition, and private ownership. Japan has viewed
this approach as encouraging waste as firms may use real resources to drive others out of
business or may duplicate R&D costs. Yet, in the face of a stagnant economy and an increasingly
integrated global economy, Japan has been under increasing pressure to modify the existing
regulatory framework and promote greater market competition.
We anticipate that the Japanese regulatory environment will increasingly converge
towards the industrial policies of other advanced industrial nations, as we enter the twenty-first
century. These reforms will act to create new markets, stimulate competition, attract foreign
investment and technology transfer, and improve consumer welfare. While the exit of declining
firms and industries will be hastened, this should eventually free resources for use in more
globally competitive sectors and should promote longer-term growth and stability. Deregulation
promises to particularly valuable in non-tradable services, such as insurance, travel (airlines),
telecommunications, and utilities. Both business and consumers will be the ultimate
beneficiaries.
Finally, global economic conditions will continue to restructure the Japanese economy.
Japan has committed to further liberalization of its markets to trade under the WTO. While
export expansion led the economic growth of the twentieth century, we anticipate that import
competition and inward FDI will play a leading role in increasing productivity in Japan in the
twenty-first. As Lawrence and  Weinstein (1998) found, using OECD data, productivity in
Japanese import sectors has grown more rapidly than in export sectors. Imports act to create a
more competitive domestic business environment. We anticipate that, as import barriers continue
to fall and as domestic distribution systems become more transparent and converge to OECD
standards, the import share of Japanese GDP will rise hence improving domestic productivity.10
We also anticipate that deregulation and a greater openness of the Japanese economy will
generate inward FDI, discussed below. The competitive pressure from such investment can play
role similar to that of import competition, enhancing productivity growth (see Blomström and
Sjöholm, 1999).
In conclusion, while it is impossible to predict in detail the future development of the
Japanese economy or any other, there is little doubt that the economy will change. In order to
guess at the future role of FDI in these changes, it is necessary to make some forecast of their
direction. We find it likely that Japan will continue to grow in per capita income and to move
further in deregulating the economy, and will therefore become more like other economies, such
as the United States.
3.  The Role of Japanese Outward Direct Investment
What role has increasing outward FDI played in the restructuring of the Japanese economy?
Outward FDI is not very large relative to the Japanese economy, and it showed little sign of
growth, in relative terms, before the mid-1980s, despite the increases in the Japanese wage level
and in the strength and size of Japanese firms (Lipsey, et al., 1998). After the rise in the value of
the Yen that began in 1985, a new trend appeared: a sharp rise in the importance of production
and employment outside Japan by Japanese firms. Employment in Japanese affiliates abroad,
which had been below 2 per cent of aggregate home employment since the early 1970s, rose to
over 5 per cent by 1996. In manufacturing, overseas employment, 5 to 6.5 per cent of home
employment before 1985, rose to 19 per cent in 1996. Value added in Japanese manufacturing
affiliates abroad roughly doubled in size relative to total manufacturing value added in Japan
between 1980 and 1992 (Lipsey, et al., 1998).11
Within multinational corporations (MNCs), employment abroad rose from under 40 per
cent of home employment in 1977 and 1980 to 55 per cent in 1992, and the affiliate share of
production within Japanese manufacturing multinationals rose from 6.5 to 16.5 per cent
(Ramstetter, 1991 and 1996).
 While overseas manufacturing affiliates were becoming more important relative to their
parents and to total manufacturing in Japan, the parents’ share of Japanese manufacturing was
shrinking. Value added in Japanese manufacturing parent firms fell from around 60 per cent of
value added in Japanese manufacturing in 1980 and 1983 to about 50 per cent in 1992. There has
apparently been a geographical reallocation of the activities of Japanese firms, and particularly
those of multinational manufacturing firms. The reallocation must have changed the
characteristics of the economy as a whole or it resulted from underlying changes in the economy.
Japan’s share of world manufacturing exports rose over 60 per cent between 1970 and
1986 and then, by 1995, declined by a quarter. During the period of rising Japanese export
shares, foreign production affiliates were small relative to aggregate Japanese employment and
output, but they were of importance in some individual sectors. In Mining, and in three
manufacturing sectors close to primary products, Food products, Non-ferrous metals, and Wood,
paper and pulp, Japanese affiliates were export-oriented, usually to the extent of half or more of
their sales, and were focussed on exporting to the Japanese market ( Ramstetter, 1991). That
concentration reflected the traditional Japanese concerns about raw material and food supplies
and kept at least part of import sources under Japanese control.
In Foods, Textiles and apparel, and Wood, paper and pulp, overseas affiliates were the
main sources of whatever share Japanese MNCs had of markets outside Japan. In two of those
industry groups that share had traditionally been small, but Textiles and apparel were a different12
case. Japanese exports alone had accounted for 12 per cent of world exports in 1970 and Japan
had a strong export comparative advantage at that time. As Japan’s share of world exports of
these products fell to 7.5 per cent in 1977 and 2 per cent in 1986, and Japan lost its comparative
advantage in this industry, Japanese affiliates took over part of the Japanese share in overseas
markets. By 1977, they were already supplying more of those markets than their parents, and by
1986 they supplied twice as much. Thus, they helped to retain for Japanese MNCs some of the
market share they might have lost if they had depended entirely on exporting from Japan.
The changes that took place in the location of the production from which Japanese MNCs
served foreign markets are shown in Table 5. By 1977, the first year for which we have affiliate
data, the affiliates had already taken over half or more of the Japanese MNCs’ foreign markets in
the declining industries, Foods, Textiles and apparel, and Wood, paper and pulp. In the next
decades, still in the period of Japanese trade ascendancy, the affiliate share in these industries
grew still further.
In the Chemicals sector, never one of Japanese export comparative advantage, and one in
which Japanese parent exports hardly grew from 1977 to 1986, affiliates were initially
unimportant. However, by 1986 they supplied two thirds of Japanese MNCs’ foreign sales.
Most of Japanese and Japanese MNC exports and affiliate sales are in the Metals,
Machinery, and Transport Equipment groups, and affiliates accounted for less than 25 per cent of
overseas markets for Japanese MNCs in 1977. That affiliate share grew in all these industries
even as Japan’s world export shares were growing, but the smallest increase in affiliate shares
was in Electrical Machinery, the sector in which Japan’s comparative advantage was greatest.
While the affiliate shares of MNC markets most closely reflect the decisions of parent
firms, these decisions affect the country as a whole, outside of the MNCs. The outcome for the13
country can be seen in Table 6, which shows how all Japanese firms, including non-MNC firms,
served their foreign markets. That calculation can be extended to 1995, because it does not
require parent data. The period of declining Japanese export shares in most closely approximated
in our data by 1986-1995.
If the adjustment required by the Japanese economy in this decade was a decline in the
role of manufacturing, the overseas affiliates contributed to it in every industry by supplying
larger and larger shares of the foreign markets served by all Japanese manufacturing firms,
MNCs and others. While the affiliate share for manufacturing as a whole grew only from 15 to
23 per cent during the high growth period, it increased from 23 to 40 per cent in the low growth
era, and to 40 per cent or more in every industry except Non-electrical Machinery.
Even in those industries in which Japan retained its comparative advantage in 1995, the
two machinery groups and Transport Equipment, the share of affiliates in serving Japan’s foreign
markets increased. The shift from exporting to affiliate production and sales was particularly
large in Transport Equipment: from an affiliate share of 16 per cent in 1986 to 45 per cent in
1995. The move to affiliate production in this case sustained Japanese exports. Of the increase of
$36 billion in exports from Japan, $31 billion were imports from Japan by manufacturing
affiliates in the Transport Equipment industry, presumably mostly components for production
there. Of the total growth in foreign market sales in this industry of $148 billion, exports from
Japan accounted for only the $36 billion mentioned above; the rest came from affiliate sales net
of their imports from Japan. Thus, the affiliates expanded the total Japanese market share in the
industry, sustained exports from Japan, and permitted a shift in Japanese home production to
inputs into the production process.14
Table 7 describes, for the whole range of manufacturing industries, the role of affiliate
production and sales in the period of decline in Japanese home country export shares. More than
half the growth in Japanese firms’ sales in foreign markets, whether from exports from Japan or
Japanese production abroad, came from the foreign production. The foreign production share
was close to or above half in all industries but one, Non-electrical Machinery. The home country
share was highest in the industry groups that contained the more sophisticated or research-
intensive industries, but not by a huge margin.
As was the case for older industries in the period of rising Japanese export share, before
1986, the affiliates were helping Japan to sustain foreign market shares at a time when Japan’s
market shares were declining, and especially in Japan’s less competitive industries.
Another area where we find significant Japanese outward FDI is in banking, but here we
find some interesting differences from manufacturing. Overseas branches of Japanese banks have
been much more important than foreign banks in Japan. The total assets of overseas branches of
Japanese banks reached a peak, in absolute terms, in 1990, after much more than doubling in the
previous eight years (Bank of Japan, 1997, pp. 94-98). After 1990, these assets declined by
almost a third, and then recovered somewhat, but they remained, in 1997, well below the 1990
level. Until 1990, Japanese banks were growing at home, as well as abroad, and even faster, so
that the assets abroad were declining relative to those at home during the latter part of the 1980s.
After 1990, the rate of decline was faster abroad than at home, so that the ratio of foreign to
domestic assets fell by almost half from 1985 to 1997.
That process, first of rapid expansion abroad, and then of contraction, is illustrated by the
changes in the position of Japanese banks in the United States, as reported in the Reserve
Board’s Reports of Conditions and Income.  From 1985 to 1990, assets of US offices of Japanese15
banks more than doubled, and grew from 6.6 to almost 12 per cent of total assets of all banks in
the United States. This share of business loans grew even faster, from about 8.5 per cent in 1985
to 19 per cent in 1990. The expansion was fed by high Japanese saving rates and restrictions on
competition by foreign institutions for Japanese saving rather than by any technological
superiority or high operating efficiency on the part of Japanese banks. After 1990, the absolute
amount of Japanese bank assets in the United States fell sharply, and their share in total assets
even more rapidly, falling to about 5.5 per cent in June 1998, well below the 1985 level. The
firm comparative advantage of Japanese banks apparently disappeared with the decline in their
domestic assets and the need to restore capital at home.
3.1 Future Trends
A continuation of the trends of the last twenty years in the Japanese economy would point to
continued relative decline of manufacturing and growth in service industries. However, a larger
share for foreign firms in somewhat liberalized finance and trade sectors might produce
reductions in employment in these areas even as output grows, if these sectors are presently as
inefficient as is often said.
Within manufacturing, and therefore in commodity trade, the declines in Japanese export
shares and the growth in affiliate shares in many old industries, such as Foods, Textiles and
apparel, and Metals, do not have much further to go. One exception is the Iron and steel industry,
although foreign affiliates have not sustained Japanese MNC shares much in that case.
Manufacturing exports are, and will probably be in the future, increasingly concentrated
in Machinery and in Transport equipment, mainly motor vehicles. Even if these remain the bulk
of Japanese exports, the trend in Electrical machinery and Transport equipment has been, and16
will probably continue to be, toward supplying more of foreign markets from affiliate
production. That trend has hardly begun for Non-electrical machinery so far.
A comparison of Japanese affiliates with US majority owned foreign affiliates points to
some differences that suggest directions for the future evolution of Japanese FDI. One is the
much smaller involvement of the Japanese affiliates in Non-electrical machinery, which includes
computers and parts, despite Japan’s comparative advantage in that industry. The revealed
comparative advantage ratio for Japanese affiliates in this industry is 0.48, as compared to 1.40
for US affiliates, although the ratios for the two home countries are close, from 1.32 to 1.42. The
likely future path is a rapid growth for Japanese affiliates in this industry.
The second difference is that in Non-electrical machinery and Transport equipment,
exports/sales ratios are much lower in Japanese affiliates than in US affiliates, 35 as against 54
per cent and 11 as against 53 per cent. The gap between US and Japanese affiliates is larger in
both developed and developing country locations, especially in Transport equipment. US
affiliates in developed countries exported 54 per cent of their output and Japanese affiliates only
14 per cent. The shares in developing countries were 43 and 7 per cent.
Both the lack of Japanese affiliate production in Non-electrical machinery and the low
export ratios of Japanese affiliates in  Electrical machinery and Transport equipment probably
reflect the relative immaturity of the Japanese affiliates. Japanese manufacturing MNCs seem to
be behind US MNCs in dividing up their output into segments and producing each segment in
the most efficient, or economical location. The future should see more movement in this
direction, especially if home labor market restrictions are loosened. The reallocation of
production to affiliates should help the parent firms to adjust to the changing conditions of17
production in Japan and improvements in host countries, and to hold on to or expand their
markets in the face of high home production costs.
Much of the reduction in Japanese banking operations abroad, and its timing, must have
reflected cyclical conditions in Japan. But the development may also be, to some extent, a
response to expectations of future liberalization at home. Until some time in the 1980s, Japanese
banks were awash in cheap funds from Japan’s high saving rate and the banks’ monopoly
position at home. With the future promising probably lower saving by an aging population and
more competition for funds from foreign financial firms entering the Japanese market, the
Japanese banks may have concluded that their problems were not temporary and that large
foreign networks would no longer be profitable.
4. The Role of Inward FDI
Japanese outward FDI takes place in industries of  existing Japanese  firms´ comparative
advantage, typically also the comparative advantage of Japan itself, present or possibly past.
Inward FDI would be expected to come into industries in which foreign firms have some firm
comparative advantage over Japanese firms. They might be export industries in which Japan
already has some comparative advantage as a location or could have with the addition of some
foreign firms' technology, or they might be non-tradable industries, or sectors of them, in which
Japanese firms are backward in some respects.
Inward FDI may affect host countries both directly and indirectly. Investments by foreign
companies will directly influence macro variables like capital formation, employment, tax
revenues, and trade. Indirectly, foreign investment may also influence the structure of the host
economy, as well as the conduct and performance of locally owned firms. Although the direct
effects of foreign direct investment may be important in certain situations and/or countries, it is18
generally accepted that a significant share of the long-run impact of FDI is likely to occur in the
form of indirect effects or “spillover” (see Blomström, 1989). This is because FDI, apart from
being a financial capital flow, also involves the capitalization of technology, knowledge, skills,
and other resources that represent the MNCs’ intangible assets.
Spillovers can occur because MNC affiliates import and demonstrate technologies that are
not used in the host country, and because their operations (or mere presence) may increase the
level of competition and force local firms to search for more efficient methods of production.
Among many possible channels for technology spillovers, the most concrete may be linkages
with foreign MNCs and hiring of employees trained in  MNCs. Recent studies have confirmed
that the nature and significance of spillovers appear to vary between countries and industries, and
that the positive effects of FDI are likely to increase with the level of local capability and
competition (see e.g. Blomström, et al., 2000a). This suggests that there is a great potential for
FDI spillovers in the Japanese economy in the future.
Historically, inward FDI has played an important role in the economic restructuring
process in Japan ( Sohn, 1998). Although always small, inward FDI was prominent in key
industrial sectors in Japan before World War II and had a significant impact in the modernization
of its industrial base in the inter-war period (see Takeshi and Udagawa, 1990). The Japanese
government actively encouraged multinational entry in heavy and chemical industries, most
notably in petroleum processing, rubber tires, automobiles, and electrical machinery. The impact
was notable in the restructuring of Japan’s economy toward high value-added manufacturing.
Western investors revolutionized the country’s industrial base by introducing technology of
advanced production, firm organization, and management. From textile MNCs was gained a
sense of quality control, western standards and design, and marketing strategies. The foreign19
automotive industry brought techniques of mass production and vertical corporate organization.
Modern methods were widely disseminated and blended with Japanese cultural practices (see
UNCTAD, 1995).
Inward investment is still very low in Japan, as is well documented in the literature (see
e.g. Yoshitomi and Graham, 1996). An often-cited figure is that foreign firms in Japan account
for only one per cent of Japanese sales. However, a more careful look at the numbers would
place sales of foreign affiliates at 5.3 to 5.7 per cent of all sales (Weinstein, 1997). These figures
are about half of that of the United States, and are well below international averages. Foreign
firms’ shares of Japanese production measured by value added, are also low in an international
comparison (see Lipsey, et al., 1998).
Low foreign involvement in the Japanese economy is due to a combination of factors that
have been discussed over the years. Until the early 1970s, Japan’s policies toward inward FDI
were extremely restrictive. Although these restrictions were largely eliminated in 1980, inward
FDI is still relatively small, leading some (e.g. Encarnacion, 1992) to suggest that private barriers
to FDI have replaced public barriers. Others, however, have argued that these findings are the
result of general entry barriers (e.g. Ramstetter and James, 1993). For instance, the cost of doing
business in Japan is exceedingly high due to high rental costs, high taxation of corporate profits,
and complicated governmental regulations. Rigidities in the labor market, such as an expectation
of ‘lifetime’ employment and high living standards, result in very high implicit wages.
Foreign entry is further limited by the difficulty of acquiring ownership in existing
Japanese firms. Cross-ownership of shares within keiretsu, vertically related groups of firms, are
thought to discourage hostile mergers and acquisitions as a low level of stocks are publicly
traded (Dunning, 1996). Furthermore, governmental regulations and subsidies favor small and20
medium-sized enterprises, while multinational activity tends to arise predominantly in large
enterprises (Weinstein, 1997).
4.1 The Future
Inward FDI will play more of a role than in the past in the sectors we expect to grow in Japan.
These include high-tech sectors in manufacturing and financial services, in which Japanese firms
are relatively backward. Foreign firms will also benefit from the ongoing deregulation of the
Japanese economy. These reforms will act to create new markets, attract foreign investment, and
stimulate competition. We can already see the beginning of this structural change.
Compared with foreign rivals, many Japanese firms are either too small or too dependent
on their home market to survive. By paring away jobs and unprofitable businesses, they are
restructuring to regain competitiveness (see e.g. Whittaker, 1997). This process – known as
risutora – is rapidly changing those sectors of the Japanese economy that are open to
competition. Mergers and acquisitions, which also involve foreign owned multinationals, make
up a big part of this restructuring. In 1998, over 900 mergers took place in Japan, which is more
than twice as many as five years earlier, and the number seems to have increased since then. The
foreign acquisitions of Japanese firms grew more than six-fold in value the same year. There is
still a long way to go, however, in comparison with the United States, where over 11,000
mergers were announced in 1998. The banking crisis is also eroding the cross-shareholdings
within the keisetsu: the major banks are trying to reduce their risk exposure by reducing their
holdings of stocks.
Developments in the auto industry can illustrate these changes as well. The companies
that were first to respond to the new challenges, primarily Honda and Toyota, are still at the top
of the world league, both technologically and financially. The laggards are now in the midst of21
the restructuring process. Ford’s stake in Mazda, Renault’s deal with Nissan, and Daimler-
Chrysler’s with Mitsubishi, are three examples of the mergers and acquisitions that are reshaping
Japan’s industry.
One sector in which the liberalization of the Japanese economy is expected to have the
greatest impact is that of banking and other finance. These are not industries, for which FDI data
are plentiful, especially banking, which is something of an orphan in the US FDI data collection
system.
US depository institutions, mainly commercial banks, clearly held a smaller toehold in
Japan at the latest FDI census data, 1994, than in most other developed countries. For example,
the ratio of assets of US depository institutions to GDP was lower in Japan than in the 9 other
large developed countries for which we have data and lower also than that in Korea, not a
country noted for welcoming inward FDI (US Department of Commerce, 1998). The same was
true for sales and employment in these institutions. Japan has apparently not been an easy market
for US banks to penetrate, at least via FDI.
The US depositary institutions were not only small in Japan in 1994, but had been
decreasing in size relative to Japanese GDP since 1982, whether we measure size by assets,
sales, or the direct investment stock, calculated at historical cost (US Department of Commerce,
1985). The assets of US - owned banks in Japan declined even more over these 12 years relative
to the assets of Japanese domestically licensed banks (Bank of Japan, 1997). Thus, there was no
apparent move into the Japanese market up to 1994 by US banks.
Since 1994, the story is somewhat different. The assets of Japanese branches and
subsidiaries of US banks rose from .24 per cent of those of Domestically Licensed Japanese
Banks in 1994, to .40 per cent at the end of 1997. Although this US bank share was tiny in22
comparison to the assets of the domestically licensed Japanese banks, there is some suggestion of
an increase in importance of the US banks, although the large fluctuations make it hard to say we
can see a trend. The rise in importance of the US banks owes almost as much to the decline in
assets of the local banks, as to growth in the US banks.
Another indicator of changes in the finance sector is the US investment position in Japan
in that sector, although it is risky to assume a close relationship between the investment stock
and activity. Within the banking sector, there was relatively slow growth in the US investment
stock until 1997. In that year, the stock jumped by about 50 per cent, possibly foreshadowing
larger future moves in response to a loosening of controls. Further evidence of change in the
banking sector is given by Japanese data on the assets of foreign banks in Japan. The absolute
size of these assets increased in most years until a peak in 1990, fell thereafter in every year until
a low point in 1994, and then began to rise again. The largest increase, by about 50 per cent, as in
the data for US banks, took place in 1997. Relative to total Japanese bank assets, the foreign
bank asset levels jumped from a low of 3.2 per cent in 1994 to 3.7, 4.6, and, in 1997, 6.6 per cent
of Japanese bank assets. Thus, the data covering all banks confirm the impression that some
barriers have been lifted and that foreign banks, have begun to increase their role in the Japanese
financial sector.
The “Other Finance” category involves far more US investment in Japan than the
banking sector, but it is hard to know what the appropriate sector within Japan is for comparison.
If we compare the US investment stock with the assets of Japanese insurance companies, a
procedure that underestimates the US role, because assets are usually much larger than the
investment stock, we find little change in the ratio through the 1980s. US investment grew
rapidly from 1982 to 1988, but the Japanese insurance sector also grew rapidly. After 1988,23
however, the US investment grew faster, and the ratio more than doubled, suggesting that some
liberalization may have been affecting this sector. However, the US direct investment data for
Finance are so heavily suppressed that it is impossible to use them to identify just what parts of
the sector are receiving the US investment.
5.  Conclusions
We expect both outward and inward FDI to play an increasingly important role in the
restructuring of the Japanese economy in the future. Outward FDI is still not very large relative
to the Japanese economy, despite the rapid growth since the mid-1980s, so there is still scope for
significant increases before it reaches the levels of other OECD countries. The outsourcing and
relocation of production will particularly affect labor intensive manufacturing operations, not
least because of demographic factors. On the domestic scene, this will facilitate the necessary
restructuring of the Japanese economy towards more advanced activities with higher value
added.
Inward FDI will presumably have an even stronger impact on the restructuring of the
Japanese economy. Although the stock of inward foreign direct investment is still very small,
there are important changes under way. Deregulation has opened up industries as well as service
sectors to foreign multinationals. In combination with the economic crisis, this has begun to
weaken the cross-shareholding relationships within the keiretsu groups, which facilitates mergers
and acquisitions between Japanese and foreign firms. The consequences of increasing foreign
participation in the Japanese economy are likely to be highly beneficial. The level of competition
and the inflow of foreign technology will increase, with higher productivity growth as a major
result.24
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Table 1:  Employment: 1997/1977
All Industries 1.23
Services 1.83
Wholesale and Retail Trade
& Eating & Drinking Places  1.24
Manufacturing  1.08
Agriculture & Forestry    .55
Source: Bank of Japan (1997) p. 363, and (1986) pp. 303-304.27





Food & Tobacco 1.23
Iron & Steel 1.14
      Textiles   .65
Source: Bank of Japan (1997) p.358. (1996) p. 356.28
Table 3: Shares of World Exports, 1995/1977, Selected Groups
Industry Groups
Electrical Machinery 1.76
Foods   .77
Metals   .75
Industries
Electronic components  4.27
Computer & other office equip.  3.30
Misc. plastic products  2.37
Household audio & video equip.  1.66
Farm & garden mach.    .46
Construction & mining mach.   .52
Source: NBER World Trade Database30
1977 1980 1986 1988
Total 19 20 28 36
Foods 87 85 100 93
Chemicals 25 27 66 59
Metals 22 20 37 45
Nonelectrical Machinery 12 13 28 23
Electrical Machinery 21 21 30 35
Transport Equipment 6 7 14 26
Other Manufacturing 41 42 48 52
   Textile & Apparel 51 57 63 67
   Wood, paper and pulp 50 61 68 68
   Other 27 31 38 44
Table 5
Share (%) of Japanese Affiliates in Total Foreign Sales by Japanese 
MNCs, 1977-1988
Note:  Total foreign sales by Japanese MNCs are the sum of manufacturing parent exports, and
sales by foreign manufacturing affiliates, minus affiliate imports from Japan and affiliate exports
to Japan from affiliate production, measured as total affiliate exports to Japan multiplled by the
ratio of affiliate imports from Japan to total affiliate sales.  Affiliate shares are derived from the
difference between total foreign sales and parent exports.  Manufacturing affiliate sales in 1986
and 1989 are from Japan, ITI (1999).  Other data are from Ramstetter (1991).31
1977 1980 1986 1988 1989 1995
Total 15 13 23 31 33 40
Foods 44 28 59 73 74 83
Chemicals 16 16 37 52 51 51
Metals 16 14 29 39 38 46
Nonelectrical Machinery 5 5 12 11 15 15
Electrical Machinery 20 19 28 38 37 42
Transport Equipment 4 5 16 25 29 45
Other Manufacturing 32 27 33 44 48 52
   Textile & Apparel 36 29 35 46 43 45
   Wood, paper and pulp 46 42 46 58 50 58
   Other 24 24 30 41 50 53
Table 6
Share (%) of Japanese Affiliates in Total Foreign Sales by Japan and 
Japanese Affiliates, 1977-1995
Note:  Foreign sales by Japan and Japanese affiliates are the sum of exports of manufactures
products from Japan and sales by foreign manufacturing affiliates, minus affiliate imports from
Japan and affiliate exports to Japan, measured as for Table 11.5.  Affiliate shares are derived
from the difference between total foreign sales and Japanese exports.  Exports of manufactured
products from Japan are from the NBER World Trade Database.  Manufacturing affiliate sales in
1977 and 1980, manufacturing affiliate imports from Japan and exports to Japan from 1977 to
1988 are from Ramstetter (1991).  Manufacturing affiliate sales from 1986 to 1995 are from ITI
(1999).  Manufacturing affiliate imports from Japan in 1989 and 1995 are adjusted from MITI
(1998).  Manufacturing affiliate exports to Japan in 1989 and 1995 are adjusted from MITI










   Textile & Apparel 67.3
   Wood, paper and pulp 67.7
   Other 64.6
Share (%) of Affiliate Production in the Growth of Japanese 
Firms' Sales of Manufactures in Foreign Markets
Table 7
Note:  The growth of Japanese firm’s sales of manufactures in foreign markets is the difference
between the growth of exports from Japan from 1986 to 1995 and the growth of Japanese sales to
foreign markets in the same period.  The data are those underlying Table 11.6.